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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

4

This report presents findings from a study exploring relationships between refugee legal aid, quality of
counsel, the fairness and efficiency of asylum procedures, and access to justice for refugee claimants
in Canada.
Legal scholars, jurists and legal associations across Canada have recognized an access to justice “crisis”. The
crisis extends to refugee claimants, and is exacerbated by unique vulnerabilities and barriers to justice.
This report defines access to justice for refugee claimants in Canada as early and affordable access to
high-quality legal representation to both prepare claims and appear before the Immigration and Refugee
Board, without systemic or economic barriers; to fully participate in and understand the refugee status
determination process; to obtain just and fair outcomes in a timely and efficient manner; and to have
recourse for poor quality or abusive representation.

The Problem
The majority of refugee claimants in Canada rely on legal aid for representation at the Immigration
and Refugee Board (IRB). The IRB is an independent, administrative tribunal tasked with making
refugee status determinations. It is supposed to function as a largely non-adversarial and inquisitorial
environment, where claimants prepare their claims with the aid of counsel and typically appear at
hearings represented by counsel.
IRB procedures can require significant legal knowledge. Claimants are often unfamiliar with procedures,
face challenges related to cross-cultural and linguistic communication, and frequently struggle with
the effects of trauma. Claimants must submit documents on tight deadlines, and compile evidence to
support their personal narrative. Submissions completed without counsel or with low quality counsel risk
omissions or
contradictions, which can undermine credibility assessments – the key determination criteria for IRB
decision-makers. The refugee system, legal aid, and access to justice are thus inextricably linked.
Asylum claims in Canada increased significantly from 16,592 in 2015, to 23,350 in 2016, to a high of
58,378 in 2019. The Federal Government responded with significant investments to increase IRB capacity
– particularly by hiring more decision-makers and opening new hearing centres across Canada. These
investments were not matched by commensurate long-term funding to increase the capacity of provincial
legal aid plans. Neither federal nor provincial funding is immediately responsive to increased demand. As
a result, increases in claims can mean overburdened legal aid systems.
In 2019, at the peak of the increase, the Government of Ontario cut all legal aid funding for refugee
claimants in that province. The Federal Government provided a one-time top-up of $26.8 million CAD to
address the
shortfall, and a subsequent renewal in the 2020-21 Federal budget. It remains unclear how funding
allocations will play out in the future, and provincial legal aid plans are now reliant on funding which is
not guaranteed, but reactive to crises. These were but the latest in a recurring pattern of crises. Similar
cuts and regulatory changes by the Federal Government in 2012, and legal aid deficits in 2017, both
specifically affected refugee claimants and raised alarms over deep cuts to services. In addition, some
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provinces do not offer legal aid for immigration and refugee matters, or do not cover costs for the
entirety of the asylum process, placing increased burdens on already stretched resources in Canada’s
most populous provinces.

5

Research Design
In order to understand how access to legal aid affects access to justice for claimants, this study employed
a multi-methods approach to collect data from stakeholder groups across Canada’s asylum system.
These included:

• An original online survey delivered to 370 IRB decision-makers;
• Fifteen semi-structured interviews with refugee claimants who experienced barriers to justice; and
• Three focus groups with lawyers, members of legal aid organizations and refugee law associations,
Immigration Consultants, and front-line staff at NGOs and shelters.

This project also presents institutional data on legal aid expenditures, representation rates, appeal rates
between represented and self-represented claimants.

Findings
Findings show that refugee claimants in Canada experience significant barriers to justice, which often
begin at the outset of their procedures and persist through the asylum process. Representation rates are
currently higher than for other tribunals, though funding for legal aid remains precarious over the midand long-term. In that context, our most important finding is that quality of representation is an urgent and
long-standing issue and that this issue currently has more significant impacts on efficiency, outcomes,
and access to justice than the inability of claimants to secure counsel.
As further developed below, the study yielded specific findings related to:

•
•
•
•
•
•

The importance of early access to high-quality counsel;
The crucial but understudied role of civil society organizations;
Impacts of legal aid funding on access to counsel;
Connections between representation, outcomes, and efficiencies;
Significant concerns around quality of representation; and
Lack of effective oversight and accountability for abusive counsel.

Policy Recommendations
A series of policy recommendations flow from these findings. Specifically, as further developed in the
Conclusions and Policy Recommendations section of this report, recommendations include:

• Establishing adequate, stable and responsive legal aid funding;
• Facilitating early access to quality counsel and assistance with file and hearing preparation;
• Exploring service delivery models that rely more heavily on refugee legal aid clinics, combined with
wraparound support services; and

• Ensuring oversight and improved reporting structures to address low-quality and abusive counsel.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3980954

6

Ce rapport présente les résultats d’une étude récente explorant les relations entre l’aide juridique aux
réfugiés, la qualité des avocats, l’équité et l’efficacité des procédures d’octroi d’asile et l’accès à la justice
pour les demandeurs du statut de réfugié au Canada.
Les spécialistes du droit, les juristes et les associations juridiques de tout le Canada ont reconnu
l’existence d’une « crise » de l’accès à la justice. Cette crise s’étend aux demandeurs du statut de réfugié
qui font face à des vulnérabilités et des obstacles supplémentaires spécifiques et uniques à la justice.
Le présent rapport définit l’accès à la justice pour les demandeurs du statut de réfugié au Canada comme
étant l’accès rapide et abordable à une représentation juridique de haut calibre : pour préparer les
demandes et comparaître devant la Commission de l’immigration et du statut de réfugié, sans obstacles
systémiques ou économiques, pour participer pleinement au processus de détermination du statut de
réfugié et de sa compréhension, et pour obtenir des résultats justes et équitables de manière rapide et
efficace ainsi que d’un recours en cas de représentation par un avocat faisant preuve d’incompétence
ou d’abus.

Le problème
La majorité des demandeurs du statut de réfugié au Canada comptent sur l’aide juridique pour être
représentés devant la Commission de l’immigration et du statut de réfugié (CISR). La CISR est un tribunal
administratif indépendant et quasi-judiciaire chargé de déterminer le statut de réfugié. La Commission
est censée fonctionner dans un environnement largement non contradictoire, où les demandeurs
préparent leurs demandes et se présentent aux audiences généralement représentés par un avocat.
Les procédures de la CISR peuvent exiger des connaissances juridiques importantes. Les demandeurs
sont souvent peu familiers avec les procédures, font face à des défis liés à la communication
interculturelle et luttent fréquemment contre les effets des traumatismes subis. Les demandeurs doivent
soumettre des documents dans des délais serrés et rassembler des preuves pour appuyer leur histoire
personnelle Les
soumissions effectuées sans l’aide d’un avocat risquent de comporter des omissions ou des
contradictions, ce qui peut nuire aux évaluations de la crédibilité, le principal critère de détermination
des décideurs de la CISR. Le système des réfugiés, l’aide juridique et l’accès à la justice sont donc
inextricablement liés.
Les demandes d’asile au Canada ont considérablement augmenté, passant de 16 592 en 2015 à 23 350
en 2016, pour atteindre un sommet de 58 378 en 2019. Le gouvernement fédéral a réagi en réalisant
d’importants investissements pour augmenter la capacité de la CISR -- notamment en embauchant
davantage de décideurs et en ouvrant de nouveaux centres d’audience à travers le Canada. Ces
investissements n’ont pas été accompagnés d’un financement proportionnel pour l’aide juridique, qui est
principalement financée par les provinces. Ni le financement fédéral ni le financement provincial ne sont
immédiatement ajustés en fonction de l’augmentation de la demande. Par conséquent, l’accroissement
des demandes peut entraîner une surcharge des systèmes d’aide juridique.
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En 2019, au plus fort de la hausse, le gouvernement de l’Ontario a coupé tout le financement de l’aide
juridique pour les demandeurs d’asile dans cette province. Le gouvernement fédéral a fourni un
complément ponctuel de 26,8 millions de dollars canadiens pour combler le manque à gagner, mais
on ne sait toujours pas comment se fera l’allocation des fonds à l’avenir. Ces crises ne sont que les plus
récentes d’une série de crises récurrentes. Des coupes et des changements réglementaires similaires
effectués par le gouvernement fédéral en 2012, et les déficits de l’aide juridique en 2017, ont tous deux
touché spécifiquement les demandeurs d’asile et ont suscité des inquiétudes quant aux coupes sombres
dans les services.

Plan de recherche
Afin de comprendre comment l’accès à l’aide juridique affecte l’accès à la justice pour les demandeurs
d’asile, cette étude a utilisé une approche multi-méthodes pour recueillir des données auprès de groupes
d’intervenants dans le système d’octroi d’asile canadien. Ces méthodes comprennent:

• Un sondage original en ligne remis à 370 décideurs de la CISR;
• Quinze entrevues semi-structurées avec des demandeurs d’asile ayant fait face à des obstacles à

la justice;
• Et trois groupes de discussion avec des avocats, des membres d’organismes d’aide juridique et
d’associations de droit des réfugiés, des consultants en immigration et du personnel de première ligne
dans des ONG et des refuges.
Ce projet présente également des données institutionnelles sur les dépenses d’aide juridique, les taux de
représentation, les taux d’appel entre les demandeurs représentés et ceux qui se représentent eux-mêmes.

Constatations
Les résultats montrent que les demandeurs d’asile au Canada sont confrontés à d’importants obstacles
à la justice, qui commencent souvent dès le début de leur procédure et persistent tout au long du
processus d’octroi d’asile. Les taux de représentation sont plus élevés que pour les autres tribunaux.
Notre conclusion la plus importante est que la qualité de la représentation est actuellement une question
plus urgente ayant des répercussions plus importantes sur l’efficacité, les résultats et l’accès à la justice
que l’incapacité des demandeurs à obtenir un avocat.
Comme nous l’expliquons plus en détail ci-dessous, l’étude a permis de dégager des conclusions
spécifiques sur les points suivants:

•
•
•
•

L’importance d’un accès rapide à un avocat aux compétences élevées;
Le rôle crucial mais peu étudié des organisations de la société civile;
L’impact du financement de l’aide juridique sur l’accès à un avocat;
Les liens entre la représentation, les résultats et l’efficacité;
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• Les préoccupations importantes concernant la qualité de la représentation;
• Et le manque de surveillance et de responsabilité des avocats commettant des abus.

Recommandations sur les politiques
Une série de recommandations sur les politiques découle de ces constats. Plus précisément, comme
cela est développé dans la section Conclusions et recommandations des politiques du présent rapport,
ces recommandations sont les suivantes:

• Établir un financement suffisant, stable et adapté de l’aide juridique;
• Faciliter l’accès précoce à un avocat compétent et à une assistance pour la préparation des
dossiers et des audiences;

• Explorer des modèles de prestation de services qui s’appuient davantage sur les services d’aide
juridique pour les réfugiés, combinés à des services de soutien généralistes;

• Et assurer une surveillance et des structures de rapport améliorées pour lutter contre les avocats
peu compétents ou malhonnêtes.
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This report examines relationships between publicly-funded legal aid, quality of legal counsel, and access
to justice for refugee claimants.
The project’s impetus was threefold. First, in 2019 the Government of Ontario cut all legal aid funding
for refugee claimants, when asylum applications were at a record high. The cuts meant real-time
repercussions on the mental health and wellbeing of claimants, and the functioning of legal aid clinics,
shelters, and refugee-devoted NGOs. Advocacy from stakeholders across Canada’s refugee system
resulted in emergency funding from the Federal Government to cover the shortfall. It remains unclear
how long that funding will last.
These cuts were but the latest in a recurring pattern of funding and service cuts specifically targeting
refugee claimants. In 2012, the Federal Government’s changes to asylum regulations, coupled with
deep legal aid funding cuts, meant provincial legal aid plans considered fundamental changes to service
provision models and overall cuts to refugee services.2 In 2017, Legal Aid Ontario and B.C.’s Legal
Services Society warned they would slash support for claimants in the absence of additional funding
for immigration and refugee legal aid services. Refugee lawyers and academics, however, warned that
including threats to service cuts in budgetary disputes risked harming vulnerable claimants.3
Second, from 2017 to 2019 the lead author and a research team examined new asylum dynamics at
Roxham Road on the New York / Québec border. Interviews with over three hundred refugee claimants
in Hamilton, Montréal, Ottawa, and Toronto revealed dozens of experiences with problematic and often
abusive lawyers, paralegals, translators, and Immigration Consultants. In some cases, private lawyers
working under legal aid certificates (or legal aid “mandates” in Québec) pushed claimants for extra fees,
often to the point where they felt extorted. In others, lawyers focusing on a single national group took
on a high volume of cases and filed refugee claims which excluded their unique experiences in favour
of virtually verbatim claims which they insisted would help their cases. Instead, they undermined their
credibility.
Third, the Federal Government responded to the increase in refugee claims with hundreds of millions
of dollars to bolster capacity at the Immigration and Refugee Board, which decides cases. These
investments were not matched by proportionately increased funding for legal aid, despite the fact that
the majority of claimants rely on it, and notwithstanding the fact that Canada’s refugee system primarily
depends on lawyers to file claims, compile and submit evidence, and prepare claimants for hearings.

2.

Taddese, Yamri. 2012. “Refugee Lawyers Alarmed at LAO Proposals,” Law Times, 12 Nov. Online: https://www.lawtimesnews.com/news/general/refugee-lawyersalarmed-at-lao-proposals/259784.

3.

Robinson, Alex. 2017. “LAO Budget Woes Mean Squeeze on Services,” Law Times, 4 July. Online: https://www.lawtimesnews.com/news/general/lao-budget-woes-meansqueeze-on-services/262616; Rehaag, Sean. 2017. “Holding Refugees Hostage at Legal Aid Ontario,” SLAW – Canada’s Online Legal Magazine, 19 June.
Online: https://www.slaw.ca/2017/06/19/holding-refugees-hostage-at-legal-aid-ontario/.
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The Centre for Refugee Studies, Canadian Forum on Civil Justice, and CERC in Migration and Integration
partnered with UNHCR Canada to explore these dynamics. We hope the project’s findings will provide
evidence to inform debates about how to improve access to justice for refugee claimants and the
functioning of Canada’s asylum system.
In the following report, we briefly explore definitions and metrics for access to justice, and apply them
to the situation of refugee claimants in Canada. We explain recent asylum trends and the functioning
of Canada’s refugee status determination system, particularly how access to publicly-funded legal aid
impacts fairness, efficiency, and outcomes. We then describe our multi-method approach to engage
stakeholders across the refugee system, present our central findings around how access to high-quality
counsel can impact refugee claimants’ access to justice, and offer a series of policy recommendations
derived from our findings.
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DEFINING ACCESS TO JUSTICE

Legal scholars, jurists, lawyers, and legal associations across
Canada have recognized a “crisis” in access to justice. This is
particularly troubling given that access to justice is a
fundamental right in democratic societies. Improving access
to justice involves removing “the obstacles that prevent the
law from doing what it was designed to do and from serving
those it was meant to serve” (Moore & Perlmutter 2020: 69).
Access to justice can be understood in many different ways
and may have different meanings depending on the context.
Until relatively recently, it was often simply defined as access
to legal services for certain types of legal disputes. This
“legal categories approach” focuses on the importance of
representation and services over information, procedural
fairness, or recognition of specific vulnerabilities (Mossman,
Schucher, & Schemeing 2010).
While this narrow understanding of access to justice remains
relevant given the impact that the availability of
representation may have on the outcomes of legal processes,
many observers now use the term more broadly to engage
with the myriad other barriers to justice beyond the simple
question of access to legal representation (Farrow & Jacobs,
2020). These include how racialized status, sexual orientation
and gender identity and expression, culture, language, and
socioeconomic status may affect the ability to access services
and to navigate legal procedures (Hughes 2013).
One broader understanding of access to justice would involve
asking whether individuals have the capacity to identify and
manage legal needs arising throughout legal processes,
as well as physical and financial access to those processes
(Dandurand & Jahn 2017; Moore and Farrow 2019).

Although no frm consensus has
emerged about the best defnition
of the term itself, a leading
analysis identifes three basic
dimensions to the concept:
procedural access to justice
(defned as an ability to invoke and
participate in justice processes);
substantive access to justice
(defned as an ability to attain
fair outcomes); and symbolic
access to justice (defined as
being accorded respect and
recognition by the system as a
whole). The core applications of
these three dimensions have
traditionally centered on court
procedures, but the scope of
applicability has gradually
expanded to a point where access
to justice can now serve as a
standard for “every institution
where law is debated, created,
found, organized, administered,
interpreted and applied” (Bates,
Bond, and Wiseman 2015: 9-10).
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Another broader understanding of access to justice is increasingly used in the administrative law context,
including in Canadian refugee law, where access to justice is sometimes understood as an element
of procedural fairness. Thus, for example, some have argued that for the refugee determination process
to be fair, people must have the ability to make a refugee claim, be assisted by legal representatives and
community organizations, be able to participate actively, be treated with respect in the decision-making
process, and receive fair outcomes (Barutciski 2012; Bates, Bond, and Wiseman 2015).
For the purposes of this study, we define access to justice for refugee claimants in Canada as early and
affordable access to high-quality legal representation to both prepare claims and appear before the
Immigration and Refugee Board, without systemic or economic barriers; to fully participate in and understand
the refugee status determination process; to obtain just and fair outcomes in a timely and efficient
manner; and to have recourse for poor quality or abusive representation by counsel.

MEASURING ACCESS TO JUSTICE
There have been some attempts at measuring access to justice in Canada. In 2012 the Canadian Bar
Association (CBA) launched its Equal Justice Initiative, publishing a series of benchmarks for ensuring
access to justice for vulnerable people in Canadian society, including its Reaching Equal Justice report
(2013) and analyses of global access to justice metrics (CBA 2014). Likewise, the Action Committee on
Access to Justice in Civil and Family Matters’ Roadmap to Change report (2013) tracked and promoted
changes in thinking from procedural access and functioning of courts to a public-first framing of access
to justice and a focus on outcomes over procedures. In 2015 the Association of Legal Aid Plans of Canada
and a Working Group of the CBA’s Access to Justice Committee began the National Legal Aid Benchmarks
Project (CBA 2015). It established 31 targets for achieving access to justice by 2030. Importantly, the CBA’s
project contributes to growing evidence that legal aid reduces costs to social services and legal systems,
illustrating the “social return on investment” from ensuring universal access to justice (Moore & Farrow
2019). Results of long-term research on barriers to justice and new ways of approaching access to justice
from a public-first and social returns on investment are now available (see the recent volume edited by
Farrow and Jacobs 2020).
Likewise, the Department of Justice developed an access to justice index (Government of Canada 2018),
primarily from a review of existing indices, mainly the U.S. National Center for Access to Justice’s Access
to Civil Justice Index (2020). The index includes four metric categories: Access to administrative bodies
(including physical and technological access), process (divided between procedural justice, access to
representation, interpersonal relations, and access to information), cost (including service charges and
intangible costs), and outcomes (see McDonald 2017).
This study identifies barriers for access to justice for refugee claimants relating to each of the four
categories in the Department of Justice index and also considers a range of other procedural barriers
outside the oversight of governmental or legal agencies.
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CANADA’S REFUGEE STATUS DETERMINATION SYSTEM AND
RECENT ASYLUM TRENDS
The Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) is an independent,
quasi-judicial tribunal tasked with making refugee status
determinations under the Immigration & Refugee Protection
Act. Its stated mission is to “resolve immigration and refugee
cases efficiently, fairly and in accordance with the law”,
including principles of administrative justice, the Charter
of Rights and Freedoms, and Canada’s obligations under
international conventions.4 The IRB divides operations
between three regions: Western (BC, Alberta, Saskatchewan,
Manitoba, Yukon, NWT); Central (Ontario, except Ottawa and
Kingston); and Eastern (Québec, NB, NS, PEI, Newfoundland,
Nunavut, and Ottawa & Kingston).
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Refugee claimants currently wait
an average of two years from the
time of fling their claim to a
hearing at the Immigration and
Refugee Board (IRB).
IRB capacity almost doubled from
21,513 fnalized claims in 2017, to
42,491 in 2019. At current rates
it will fnalize 46,000 to 48,000
claims in 2021.

The IRB is Canada’s largest administrative tribunal, currently
employing 370 decision-makers at the Refugee Protection
Division (RPD), which hears first instances of refugee claims,
and the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD), which hears appeals,
The IRB’s case backlog more than
mostly for negative RPD decisions. IRB decision-makers,
known as Members, must determine whether claimants meet
doubled from 17,537 in 2016 to
the 1951 Convention definition: “someone who is unable
43,250 in 2017. It peaked at 87,270
or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a
in 2019. At current rates the
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
backlog will decrease to 47,106
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group,
or political opinion.” Members must also determine whether
by 2022, to between 47,000 to
claimants are Persons in Need of Protection, meaning that
58,000, depending on intake.
they face a risk to their lives, a risk of torture, or a risk of
cruel and unusual treatment. If Members find that claimants
meet either the 1951 Refugee Convention definition or the definition of Persons in Need of Protection,
claimants receive refugee protection. While Members consider a wide range of factors in making their
determinations, a key factor is their credibility assessment (Evans Cameron 2018). Credibility assessments
are judgments about whether a claimant’s narrative is, on a balance of probabilities, truthful.

The IRB has come under considerable strain in recent years. In 2016, 23,350 people claimed refugee
status in Canada. That number more than doubled to 47,425 in 2017, 55,388 in 2018, and 58,378 in 2019,
before dropping to 18,500 in 2020. The latter decrease can be largely attributed to the closing of the U.S. /
Canada land border and truncated international travel as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. RPD figures
from 2019-2021 include appeals referred back to the RPD. Historically, and as described in “Fig. 1: Total
Represented and Self-Represented Claimants at the RPD, by Region”, the majority of claims are lodged in
Ontario and Québec, and heard in the IRB’s Central and Eastern regions. While at the time of this report’s
release the strain has been eased as a result of the decline in international mobility, funding shortfalls
are a recurrent problem and should be addressed at a time when the strain on the system is low.

4. IRB, 2021 “About the Board”: https://irb.gc.ca/en/board/Pages/index.aspx.
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The increase in the number of claims was not initially matched by a proportionate increase in
investments in the refugee determination process or in related services, such as emergency shelters and
settlement organizations. This initial mismatch strained the reception capacities of major cities in Ontario
and Québec and contributed to a two-year backlog for RPD hearings (Yeates 2018; Parliamentary Budget
Office 2018). In January 2016, just over 17,500 cases were pending at the RPD. By the following year the
backlog had increased to almost 47,000 as of November 2017. By November 2019, it had almost doubled
to over 87,000 – the majority in Ontario and Québec. Finally, by the end of May 2020, the RPD backlog
peaked at almost 93,000 claims. A 2019 report to Parliament found that if application rates remained
constant, backlogs might have increased to five years by 2030 (Office of the Auditor General of Canada).

FIG. 1: REFUGEE CLAIM & RPD STATISTICS 2013-2021

*2021 RPD rates and projected backlog annualized using available IRB data at time of writing (Jan-June).
Source: https://irb.gc.ca/en/statistics/protection/Pages/RPDStat2021.aspx

In response, the Federal Government provided significant additional funding to the IRB, allowing
for increased capacity through hiring new decision-makers and opening new hearing centres across
Canada, which significantly increased annual decision rates. In 2016, the RPD finalized 15,761 cases
(16,432 including Legacy Claims). By 2019, capacity had almost tripled to 42,491 cases (43,004 including
Legacy Claims). Decision rates dropped dramatically in 2020 when the pandemic forced a shift to online
hearings, though increased again significantly in 2021.
While this increased funding to the IRB has been crucial to maintaining Canada’s refugee status
determination system, increased decision-making capacity has not thus far been matched by
proportionate or stable investments in legal aid.
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REFUGEE CLAIMANTS & THE LEGAL AID FUNDING GAP
Legal representation by high-quality counsel is integral
to IRB efficiency and maintaining public trust in Canada’s
refugee system. Perhaps more importantly, representation
significantly affects claimants’ rights to a fair and efficient
process. Procedural fairness and non-discrimination are
core guarantees under the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, which applies to citizens and non-citizens alike,
including refugee claimants. These aspects of administrative
law are also crucial metrics for access to justice.
Provincial legal aid plans are mandated to ensure access
to justice by providing government-funded representation
for low-income individuals. Legal aid provision is divided
between private lawyers who accept legal aid certificates,
devoted community clinics, and legal aid lawyers such as at the
Montreal Legal Aid Immigration Law Office, or the Refugee Law
Office in Ontario – though systems vary between provinces. For
example, the governments of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and
Saskatchewan do not offer legal aid for refugee claimants.
Estimates suggest that more than 70% of refugee claimants
rely on legal aid nationally (CBC 2019). Legal aid is particularly
important given the context of flight from persecution.
Claimants often arrive in Canada with few resources, and
experience language barriers and unfamiliar procedures.
Seeking refuge is made more complicated by short timeframes
for filing claims and the need to submit complex corroborating
evidence, including psychological and medical assessments
and intimate life details, often from countries from which they
have fled.

In FY2019-20, 5% of legal aid
budgets nationally were allocated
to immigration & refugee matters.
Nationally, expenditures for
refugee and immigration legal
aid increased from $25 million
CAD in FY2014-15, to over $58
million CAD in FY2019-20.
In FY2019-20, Ontario accounted
for 56.5% of all refugee legal aid
certifcates, & Québec accounted
for 31.2%.

We’re just lurching from crisis to
crisis […] The government made
a massive investment in the IRB
over the last few years and didn’t
make the same sort of proactive
investment in counsel […] The
IRB can’t do its job without highquality counsel in the seat.

Legal aid budgets are not responsive to demand. In 2017 the
CBA published a letter to the Minister of Justice, highlighting
how lack of funding increases commensurate with an
- Legal Aid
increase in the number of refugee claims meant legal aid
plans in Ontario and British Columbia faced the possibility of
Ontario Representative
suspending services for claimants.5 Similar budget shortfalls
occurred in Québec. The CBA noted legal aid shortfalls can
lead to more self-represented claimants at the IRB, longer procedures and delays, and breaches of natural
justice and administrative law.

Funding is made more complicated given that legal aid is largely a provincial competence, whereas the
refugee determination system falls within federal jurisdiction. Differences in funding across provinces mean
inconsistent access to justice depending on where claimants reside – for instance, the absence of funding
for refugee legal aid in Saskatchewan, or that claimants must repay legal fees after a successful application
in Alberta. As described in Table 1, legal aid expenditures also vary significantly between provinces.
Relatively poor data makes it difficult to analyze efficiencies, but it is clear that the relationship between
total expenditures and costs per certificate (legal aid “mandate” in Québec) likewise vary significantly, and
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TABLE 1: PROVINCIAL LEGAL AID EXPENDITURES AND I&R CERTIFICATES
2012-13

I&R
Expendtures
(CAD)

2013-14

RPD
Certificates

RAD
Certificates

Other
I&R
Certificates

I&R
Expendtures
(CAD)

RPD
Certificates

RAD
Certificates

Other
I&R
Certificates

320.53

NA

NA

NA

24157

NA

NA

NA

Quebec

4,980,329

3,043

3

1,715

3,179,608

2,047

270

1,833

Ontario

21,315,000

NA

NA

NA

17,543,000

4,061

149

1,098

103,230

40

3

NA

121,077

50

4

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

521,709

NA

NA

NA

1,720,311

755

0

NA

1,965,505

368

14

NA

RAD
Certificates

Other
I&R
Certificates

NL & Labrador

Manitoba
Alberta
British Columbia

2014-15

I&R
Expendtures
(CAD)

RPD
Certificates

2015-16

RAD
Certificates

Other
I&R
Certificates

I&R
Expendtures
(CAD)

RPD
Certificates

23323

7

NA

NA

15621

5

NA

NA

Quebec

3,810,350

1,664

388

1,872

3,766,458

1,641

448

2,441

Ontario

19,172,000

5,068

263

1,114

30,929,000

6,620

640

2008

129,325

47

3

NA

94,242

107

21

NA

452,267

NA

NA

NA

745,169

NA

NA

NA

2,178,190

402

52

NA

2,147,780

404

38

NA

RAD
Certificates

Other
I&R
Certificates

NL & Labrador

Manitoba
Alberta
British Columbia

2016-17

I&R
Expendtures
(CAD)

RPD
Certificates

2017-18

RAD
Certificates

Other
I&R
Certificates

I&R
Expendtures
(CAD)

RPD
Certificates

21,634

4

NA

NA

21,364

15

NA

NA

Quebec

3,540,014

2,390

464

2,768

5,065,253

9,465

569

2,665

Ontario

37,524,000

9,005

1,000

2,653

42,623,000

10,588

1,181

1,917

259,807

201

24

NA

625,405

583

136

NA

780,142

NA

NA

NA

1,032,236

312

45

532

2,782,815

745

63

NA

3,402,538

1131

40

NA

RAD
Certificates

Other
I&R
Certificates

NL & Labrador

Manitoba
Alberta
British Columbia

2018-19

I&R
Expendtures
(CAD)

RPD
Certificates

2019-20

RAD
Certificates

Other
I&R
Certificates

I&R
Expendtures
(CAD)

RPD
Certificates

17,919

8

NA

NA

51,658

15

NA

NA

Quebec

6,565,499

7,188

518

2,605

7,791,884

7,598

330

2,363

Ontario

43,012,000

13,304

1,058

1,819

43,199,084

13,781

561

1,160

481,634

484

62

NA

485,012

267

14

NA

Alberta

1,027,882

1,015

83

405

1,353,957

1048

66

157

British Columbia

3,920,459

1133

90

NA

5,363,354

1623

91

NA

NL & Labrador

Manitoba

“RPD” = Refugee Protection Division | “RAD” = Refugee Appeals Division
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offer significantly less remuneration per case than other areas
of law.
Jurisdictional competences also mean legal aid for refugee
claimants is open to several layers of politicization, with impacts
on interprovincial and federal politics. The most glaring recent
example, occurred in April 2019 when the Government of Ontario
cut LAO funding by $133 million – 30% of LAO’s budget – with a
specific direction not to allocate funds to refugee claims. Funding
cuts were effective immediately. The timing coincided both with
the Federal election and thousands of monthly refugee claims
at Roxham Road on the New York / Québec border. Federal
opposition parties had sought to make Roxham Road a ballot box
issue, exacerbating a complex intergovernmental problem, and
undermining norms of interprovincial responsibility-sharing
(Spratt 2019; Paquet & Schertzer 2020). Regrettably, these tactics
mirrored types of “burden-shifting” policies employed to influence
electoral politics between and within other liberal democracies,
particularly in Europe (see Thielemann 2018).

“Immigration and refugee cases
have increased in Ontario over
the past few years. Vulnerable
individuals will continue to have
serious legal issues that, without
legal aid, will be unsupported,
causing a greater fnancial drain
on the system, longer time to
less reliable resolutions, and an
overall defcit in the application
of the principles of justice that
we hold dear.”
-Former Supreme Court Chief
Justice Beverly McLachlin
(2019)

In this context, in the spring of 2019, LAO announced that it
would no longer fund most new refugee law services beyond
helping clients complete their Basis of Claim forms (Canadian
Press 2019). Organizations including the
Canadian Bar Association, Law Society of Ontario, Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers,
and Canadian Council for Refugees decried the decision as politicized and “punching down” at
vulnerable claimants.

In August 2019, the Federal Government stepped in, and full services were immediately resumed.
The 2020-21 Federal Budget devoted another $26.8 million across all provinces. It remains unclear
what will happen if these top-ups are not renewed in subsequent fiscal years, though future cuts would
inevitably affect IRB efficiency and claimants’ access to justice. The current situation of funding as an
emergency response is inadequate for building a resilient and fair asylum system.

REPRESENTATION AND IRB FAIRNESS AND EFFICIENCY
The IRB is often held up as a global exemplar of a fair and efficient model for refugee status
determination (Barutciski 2012). That reputation relies, in good measure, on the fact that claimants are
represented by counsel in a predominantly non-adversarial process. Despite this positive reputation,
research shows significant inconsistency in recognition rates among the same countries of origin and
types of claims, suggesting that decision-maker bias, opinion, and expectations for evidence can be more
consequential than the merits of a specific claim (Rehaag 2008; 2014; Colaiacovo 2013). This variation is
evidence of what some have called “luck of the draw” (Rehaag 2012), or “refugee roulette” (Macklin 2009).6
5.

CBA. 2 Oct, 2017. “Insufficient Funding for Immigration and Refugee Legal Aid Services across Canada: Impact on Right to Representation by a Lawyer.
” https://www.cba.org/CMSPages/GetFile.aspx?guid=eeea0bb9-2f10-46bc-8a7a-81626d2baec4.

6.

The IRB provided an explanatory note contextualizing research on variation and recognition rates. See: https://refugeelab.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/IRB_
explanatory-note-member-decisions-RAD-RPD-E.pdf.
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However, other research has revealed that variation is not
solely the result of decision-maker subjectivity, but is often
the result of lack of or quality of counsel – both in preparing
a claim and in hearings (Tomkinson 2014; Liew et al. 2019).
The asylum process can require significant legal knowledge and
claimants can be subject to intensive questioning by Members
(Barutciski 2012; Liew et al 2019). Claimants are often unfamiliar
with the process, face challenges related to cross-cultural
communication, and frequently struggle with the effects of
trauma, at times exacerbated by detention (Bond et al 2016).
Most claimants are from lower socioeconomic brackets (Bond
and Wiseman 2014). The refugee system, legal aid, and access
to justice are therefore inextricably linked.
The pre-hearing phase is consequential. Claimants must submit
a narrative Basis of Claim (BOC) form within fifteen days, which
details their reason for flight. They must also compile evidence
to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that their experience
meets tests for refugee protection. BOC forms and evidence
completed without the aid of counsel or with the aid of lowquality counsel risk omissions or contradictions, which may be
found to undermine credibility. Lawyers commonly prepare by
ole-playing to familiarize claimants with procedures, by advising
claimants on how to address IRB Members, and by addressing
inconsistencies between BOC forms and secondary sources
(CCR 2014).

“Access to justice is a
foundational component of the
rule of law and fundamental
human rights issues for all
members of our society, which
includes refugees, immigrants,
and those with precarious
status. With respect to refugees
[…] the consequences of
immigration actions and
government decisions can be dire.
A refugee who cannot rely on
prompt and effective legal
representation is at risk for
arbitrary deportation to a
terrifying future flled with
torture or even death.
-Barbara Jo Caruso, Chair of CBA
Immigration Law Section.

IRB decision-makers must weigh a range of factors, including the
level of detail (for instance, specific dates and times of events),
discrepancies between testimony and available evidence, and corroborative evidence (IRB 2004). Each
depends a good deal on access to counsel, the quality of counsel, and counsel’s rapport with Members
(Tomkinson 2018). Rehaag (2011) explored 70,000 decisions made between 2005 and 2009, and found that
57% of claimants were successful when represented by lawyers, whereas only 15.2% were successful
when they were unrepresented. He also found lawyers’ professional experience had a significant impact on
outcomes. In spite of this evidence, it is difficult to establish scholarly consensus on the impact of legal
aid on IRB outcomes. Rehaag’s investigation remains the only comprehensive empirical Canadian study
on the impact of representation on outcomes (Buhler and Korpan 2019).
Given this context, legal aid cuts could lead to significant knock-on effects. More claimants might proceed
without representation, or engage low-quality representation through under-prepared or over-worked
private lawyers, paralegals, or Immigration Consultants outside of legal aid (Parliament of Canada 2017).
Inadequate written materials and preparation may result in longer or adjourned hearings as RPD Members
seek to provide some measure of procedural fairness. As discussed in detail below, although no causal
relationship is established through this study, self-represented or poorly represented claimants are more
likely to receive negative decisions, leading to more appeals and higher costs to individuals and the system.
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Quality of counsel concerns can also be raised to the RAD or through judicial review. These are timeconsuming and increase workloads as decisions are overturned and sent back for redetermination. Higher
successful appeal rates could, over time, prompt the Federal Court to be less deferential towards IRB
decision-making, on the theory that past errors suggest careful scrutiny is needed over IRB decisions. If
this results in more cases being closely looked at not only by the RAD but also by the Federal Court, the
system will experience further delays. Ultimately, legal aid shortfalls may compromise the rule of law and
procedural justice (Bond 2012). Finally, perceived inefficiencies risk eroding public trust in the refugee
status determination system (Environics 2019).

3. UNDERSTANDING ACCESS TO
JUSTICE FOR REFUGEE
CLAIMANTS: A STAKEHOLDER
APPROACH
The previous sections illustrated that access to justice, including access to publicly-funded, high-quality legal
counsel, is integral to the functioning of Canada’s refugee status determination system, particularly to the
fairness and efficiency at the Immigration and Refugee Board. They also illustrated that funding for
refugee legal aid has not kept up with investments in procedural and administrative aspects of Canada’s
refugee status determination system, nor has it increased apace with demand for services. Yet there
is relatively little research on how these dynamics interact, nor on how they affect various stakeholders,
including refuge claimants.
In order to address these issues, this project employed a multi-methods approach to collect data from
stakeholder groups across Canada’s asylum system. Data collection was comprised of semi-structured
interviews with refugee claimants; focus groups with lawyers and members of legal aid organizations,
Immigration Consultants, and front-line staff at NGOs and shelters; and surveys with IRB Members. This
project also uses quantitative data on legal aid funding, representation rates, and appeals. Data collection
ran concurrently from February to August 2021.
The scope of the project did not allow for financial analysis exploring quantitative relationships between
legal aid funding and impacts on or efficiencies in the asylum system or broader social services. It was
conducted and completed during the COVID-19 pandemic, which impacted methodological options
and choices.
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Interviews

We conducted 15 original semi-structured interviews with refugee claimants in British Columbia, Alberta,
Ontario, and Québec who experienced barriers accessing justice. Recruitment did not seek a representative
sample, but specifically to develop a deeper understanding of how claimants experienced barriers to justice.
We recruited by disseminating posters in several languages to shelters, community organizations, legal
clinics, and service providers including food banks and medical clinics. We also posted on social media.
Recruitment asked for participants who experienced barriers stemming from:

•
•
•
•
•

Negative interactions with lawyers, consultants, IRB Members, or the CBSA;
Poor quality representation or exploitation by counsel;
Changes to legal aid funding or financial ineligibility;
Changes to IRPA diverting claims to the PRRA-only stream; and / or
Other barriers around lack of access to legal aid.

Interviews lasted from sixty to ninety minutes over Zoom, in participants’ language of choice. We interviewed
claimants in Vancouver, Calgary, Hamilton, Toronto, and Montréal. The format allowed participants to relate
narratives at their own pace. Our overarching goal was to consider claimants as key stakeholders with
unique perspectives. Each interview ended by soliciting policy recommendations to improve access to
justice. Participants received a $50 CAD honorarium.

Focus Groups

Second, we conducted three, 90-minute focus groups with refugee lawyers and representatives of
refugee law organizations and committees, immigration consultants, representatives from provincial legal
aid plans, and staff at frontline community organizations and shelters across Canada (with a total of
seventeen expert participants).7 We used a method known as “structured eavesdropping” to encourage
peer-to-peer conversation comparing opinions, perspectives, and experiences. Focus groups began
with a high-level discussion around functional definitions of access to justice for refugee claimants, followed
by differences among service provision. We then presented anonymized scenarios derived from semistructured interviews, and asked participants to reflect on points of intervention and policy changes
that would have addressed access to justice concerns.

Survey

Third, we delivered an online survey to all RPD and RAD Members. This project is unique insofar as the IRB was
a partner in, rather than the object of, academic research. Surveys were delivered in English and French,
and transmitted to Members by relevant Deputy Chairs. We received 158 responses (88 RPD, 70 RAD) –
43% of potential respondents.
The survey used five-point Likert scales, which asked respondents to note the degree to which they agreed
or disagreed with statements, frequency of experiences, and whether these were associated with relationships
between claimants and counsel (e.g., “strongly disagree, disagree, agree, strongly agree, N/A”). It was
comprised of thirty questions and multiple sub-questions, and included one open text field for respondents
to highlight issues not included in the survey.

7.

Focus group participants included representatives from Alberta, Manitoba, Ontario, and Québec legal aid plans; the Canadian Association for Refugee Lawyers,
Refugee Lawyers Association of Ontario, Canadian Bar Association’s Immigration Law Section, and Legal Aid Ontario’s Refugee Law Office; and several legal clinics
and frontline organizations across Canada, including in provinces with no funding for refugee legal aid.
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4. FINDINGS
THE VALUE OF EARLY ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND HEARING PREPARATION
Qualitative data illustrates how early access to information
about refugee procedures and legal services can be crucial
determinants in access to justice. NGOs, including shelters
and community organizations, play an indispensable and
understudied role in this aspect of Canada’s refugee system.
A significant part of that role is helping claimants understand
and navigate systems, access services, and connect with
trusted counsel. For example, NGOs across Canada provide
mock hearing programs and courses to prepare claimants
for their experience at the IRB – these include the Ready
Tours across several Canadian cities, and Refugee Hearing
Program and Mock Hearing Program for LGBTQ+ claimants
in Toronto.8 These programs are not universally available,
and often depend on short-term municipal, provincial, and
federal grants.
Community organizations very often intervene in cases where
claimants are ineligible for or unaware of legal aid, made vulnerable
by poor representation, or face various types of abuse. Several
stakeholders framed their role as “damage control” or catching
claimants who have “fallen through the cracks”. Throughout
focus groups and informal conversations, stakeholders stressed
the importance (and lamented the absence) of “wraparound”
support beginning at the earliest stages to provide reliable
guidance about the refugee claims process, and help claimants
when they begin to face barriers, rather than to address these
barriers after the fact.

Refugee Claimants’ Options
for Representation
• Privately paid lawyers
• Lawyers who accept legal aid
certifcates
• Government-funded legal
clinics and legal aid
staff offces
• Pro-bono lawyers
• Supervised students-at-law
• Immigration consultants
• Paralegals (and notaries
in Quebec)
• Unpaid representatives
(family, friends, volunteer
organizations, etc)

For claimants who qualify for legal aid, there are often additional challenges finding quality counsel to take on
their case. While in some cases they are paired with duty counsel working in devoted legal-aid clinics, many
claimants in Ontario, Québec, and British Columbia are simply provided with a list of lawyers’ names and
contact information, and work their way down that list until they receive a response (see Teklu 2020: 12-13).
This form of referral presents a particular burden for those who require language interpretation. Legal aid
policies mean it is difficult to change counsel once a lawyer accepts a legal aid certificate.9 As a support
worker from a Toronto organization related:
Some clients we help out have been unfortunately tethered to counsel that hasn’t
provided the best support, and above all don’t communicate with them. They don’t
8.

For mor information please see: https://refugeeclaim.ca/en/ready-tours/; https://www.matthewhouserhp.com/; https://www.the519.org/programs/mock-hearing-program.

9.

As with other aspects of refugee legal aid, the situation differs across provinces. In Québec, there are no regulatory barriers to changing counsel when represented
by a private lawyer working under a legal aid mandate. However, if the client chooses to be represented by a staff lawyer at a refugee legal aid office, the lawyer
is generally assigned. If a claimant is represented by a staff lawyer and wishes to change lawyers, they will generally be required to seek out a private lawyer who
accepts legal aid mandates.
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tell them what needs to provided [or] give any
updates on the process. [Claimants] are forced to
rush and provide evidence on time; and they’re left
feeling uncertain even before the hearing itself. All
too often they’re not fully prepared. That’s where we
often have to step in.10
The situation is made more stressful given short timelines for
submitting documentation after a claim is registered. Six of
fifteen claimants reported how choice of poor-quality counsel
reverberated through their claim process, which they often
associated with negative decisions at the IRB. One claimant
based in Vancouver explained how their lawyer and interpreter
were criminally charged for filing false claims and forging
documents, and removed from the legal aid list:
It was a challenge to find a lawyer at first, but I didn’t
have any difficulties through the process, preparing
my claim and all that. But […] last year we were
informed that [the lawyer] has been [suspended] and
that within 21 days we have to tell them the name of
a new lawyer who willrepresent on my hearing date.
And if I won’t be having a lawyer they will assume I will
be representing myself.

“My frst thought when I look at
the term “access to justice”? In
this context it’s trying to match
up a legal representative to a
refugee as quickly as possible,
as early in the process as possible,
to give them the most information
at the earliest possible point […]
because if you can’t do that it
becomes about damage control.”
-Director at
Manitoba Legal Aid

It was a hectic time. You feel so confused and you
don’t know what to do. You lock yourself up all day
trying to call people. You’re unable to eat well, you’re
so destabilized. That’s the word, yeah, destabilized.11
The claimant was able to find a new lawyer at the eleventh hour through support from a community organization.
Claimants also recounted having emails and calls ignored, appointments cancelled, and often settling on
the first lawyer who responded, despite negative experiences. They also recounted cases where private
lawyers who accepted legal aid certificates did not meet with them beyond an initial appointment, even in
the lead-up to hearings. However, focus group participants took pains to illustrate ways in which these
dynamics are often driven, in part, by funding models which mean lawyers who represent claimants
often work far outside of the prescribed tariffs – and thus need to take on a higher volume of cases.
A claimant living in Montréal recounted a particularly negative experience:
First, I called a lawyer who cancelled our appointment. So, I went back to the list from
legal aid. But days were passing. After a few days finally I got one lawyer to answer […]
They told me I could make an appointment with their temporary replacement. But
that lawyer, I haven’t heard from in over a year. I sent her information pertaining
to my case, all these evidences and [a BOC] we wrote together, and then there was
10. Focus Group, 17 May, 2021
11. Online Interview (Vancouver), 3 March, 2021
12. Online Interview (Montreal), 12 May, 2021
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no response. To this day, no response. Her last email said she’s on sabbatical. She
never filed my claim. I switched lawyers again and this is the one who will represent
me, but so much time was wasted. At the end we had two days to do the [BOC].12
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IRB survey respondents highlighted similar dynamics. As an RPD Member wrote:
Often, counsel appear not to be engaging with their clients in a manner that
would prepare them for obvious and commonly considered questions. It can
be surprising that counsel would not have already listened to the client’s story,
asked them about any gaps or inconsistencies, and resolved them prior to the
hearing. It often seems that they haven’t spoken to their client since filing
their BOC, and in some cases it seems they’ve never met in person.

LEGAL AID FUNDING AND AVAILABILITY OF REPRESENTATION
Relationships between legal aid funding and representation rates are not straightforward, and
complicated by differences between provinces and the multi-stage claim process. While representation
rates vary between fiscal years and regions, national average rates since FY2013-2014 for all new system
claims at the RPD are high, at 94%. The lowest national rate of representation was 91% in FY2013-14,
which was significantly depressed by low representation in the Western region at 83%.
This difference in representation rates may be partly attributable to the inconsistent availability of and
approaches to legal aid for immigration and refugee matters between jurisdictions.

FIG. 2: PERCENTAGE OF SELF-REPRESENTED CLAIMANTS AT THE RPD
FY2013-14 TO FY2020-21 NEW SYSTEM CLAIMS

National and regional averages, however, obscure total numbers of self-represented claimants,
particularly since post-2016 figures began appearing in data. As described in “Fig.3”, below, higher claim
rates correlate with more claimants appearing self-represented. Unfortunately, the IRB does not maintain
data on whether claimants or appellants are represented by private or publicly-funded counsel, though
their data disaggregates between representation by lawyers, immigration consultants, or pro-bono
representatives without legal training.
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Likewise, provincial legal aid data can be difficult to compare because the data is generally not sufficiently
granular to verify that reporting methods are similar. For example, there may be varying practices in when
a certificate or expenditure is counted, in aggregating immigration and refugee expenditures or refugee
certificates between stages of the asylum process, in breaking out data on certificates for the RPD or RAD
or are for single cases of families, and in whether reported yearly expenditures include administrative
costs or simply the cost of certificates.13 As such, we hesitate to suggest direct relationships between legal
aid funding for claimants, representation, and IRB decision rates.14 As described in “Table 1.” above, overall
provincial legal aid expenditures have increased year on year where the majority of claims are registered.
We note the available data shows the average cost per certificate for representation at the RPD or RAD
have diverged significantly between provinces in real dollar terms, particularly between Ontario and
Québec. We also note that overall expenditures lag behind changes in claim rates per province.
Discussions with stakeholders across regions noted that higher claim rates stretch available resources,
and that legal aid lawyers, clinics, and private lawyers who accept legal aid certificates have less capacity
to take on new clients. In turn, claimants are pushed to prepare claims and appear self-represented, or
opt for potentially less capable private lawyers who do not focus on immigration and refugee matters,
and Immigration Consultants with less training and specialization in preparing files and appearing before
the IRB.

FIG. 3: REPRESENTED AND SELF-REPRESENTED CLAIMANTS AT THE RPD
FY2013-14 TO FY2020-21 NEW SYSTEM CLAIMS

Likewise, while national legal aid expenditures have increased annually, they have declined when
calculated against inflation and demand. Federal contributions to legal aid in Ontario, for example,
shrunk from $3.98 to $3.22 per capita between FY2002-2003 and FY2014-2015 when adjusted for
inflation (Zemans and Amaral 2018). LAO, which covers the highest number of claimants, faced a budget
shortfall of over $70 million in 2020, despite federal top-ups.
Unstable and inflexible funding has significant impacts on legal aid capacity. Stakeholders reported that
funding insecurity and lack of responsiveness to demand meant a significant degree of insecurity around
13. This study relies on data transmitted by provincial legal aid plans (in the cases of BC, Manitoba, Ontario, and NL and Labrador), and provincial justice ministries
(in the cases of Alberta and Québec).
14. Future peer-reviewed papers will attempt to obtain comparable data from provincial ministries and national departments.
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financial and logistical planning. Participants in focus groups
noted specifically that:
At one or two occasions over the past ten years
or so we had situations when funding for Legal
Aid generally was under threat from a budgetary
priority point of view. And I think if that is to
continue it could actually threaten everything
we are talking about. Without stable funding all
these discussions about early interventions and
access to justice become kind of moot. We built
the system on that assumption that counsel is
present throughout the process.
The 2019 funding cuts in Ontario were mentioned repeatedly
as an example of the impacts on access to justice. As a lawyer
representing a large legal clinic described:
I want to emphasize how profoundly destabilizing
funding can be. We recently had an experience [in
Ontario] when the incoming provincial government
cut Legal Aid funding and specifically directed that no
funds ought to be spent on refugee and immigration
services. Were it not for the federal government
covering that gap… At the time we were having
serious discussions within the clinic as to whether
or not we could continue providing refugee and
immigration services at all. I don’t know where to
start when it comes to the effects that would have
on access to justice for vulnerable claimants.15

With respect to the federal
government’s responsibility: The
funding is key. We’re just lurching
from crisis to crisis. Like it’s literally
been fve, maybe six years now,
that we’ve been midway through
the fscal year and still had no idea
what our budget was. And having
even something basic like indexing
according to the number of
claimants, for example, would be
a huge step in the right direction.
The government made a massive
investment in the IRB over the
last few years and didn’t make
the same sort of proactive multiyear investment in counsel […]
The IRB can’t do its job without
high-quality counsel in the seat.
-LAO Representative

Claimants must meet both merit-based and financial eligibility requirements. According to representatives
from provincial legal aid plans, rejection on merit assessments has become increasingly rare since
2012/13. Financial eligibility requirements, however, are a consistent and complicated issue. Even under
stable funding conditions, eligibility models mean claimants often find themselves without support as
their case progresses given timelines around initial claims, employment eligibility, and long hearing delays.
While most are eligible for initial phases, many become ineligible for their RPD hearing, and even more in
the event of an appeal.
BOC forms are submitted before claimants receive work permits or earn taxable income. Backlogs mean
they often work for a year or more before hearings, and even minimal income can render them ineligible
for legal aid. In Ontario, where most claimants reside, eligibility for individuals is capped at $18,795 gross
(before tax) annual income, and up to $50,803 for a household of five or more. These figures are below
the Federal $21,899 Low-Income Cut-Off for single adults, slightly higher than the $47,148 for families of
five, and lower than the upper caps of $52,298 for families of six and $57,429 for households of seven or
more.16 The annual average cost of living in Ontario for a single person in a rental property is over $42,000.
This is not simply a problem for refugee claimants. Indeed, a significant part of the access to justice crisis in
15. Focus Group, 17 May, 2021.
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Canada is due to the fact that while a large proportion of Canadians will require representation
every year, one has to be very poor or quite wealthy to engage counsel and access procedures. The
majority of Canadians fall between these two extremes (see Trebilock, Duggan, & Sossin 2012). From an
access to justice perspective, claimants whose income is under the poverty line, yet above the financial
eligibility cut-off, may have to choose between paying for counsel or appearing self-represented.

CASE STUDY
A 43-year-old claimant Mexico was eligible for legal aid for her RPD hearing, but
their claim was rejeted. Both the claimant and her husband work full time, minimum
wage jobs. Community organization staff explained they needed to re-apply for an
appeal.
“I tried to apply for Legal Aid again. They asked deep questions about my money.
How much I’m earning; how much is my husband earning […] everything about my
bank [accounts]. They told me ‘We are allowed to check how much you have. Do you
have savings?’ So fnally, I say ‘Yes, I have some savings. Maybe like $4000’. And
they asked ‘Why?’ Why I have savings? You have to understand my situation, I’m a
mother. I have to do some saving because I know in any moment Canada can [reject
my claim] and what am I going to do? I have to go back Mexico in the middle of the
pandemic! In the middle of all this situation.
I’m working really, really hard to have some savings. And I tell the truth. And they
said ‘you are not allowed legal aid because you have money in the bank and your
family has income.’ And then I learned [from staff at an NGO] that my chance at
appeal is so low because we’re from Mexico. And so, my choice is to use up all my
savings or give up and go back to the cartels. And that is my big [confict]. And
probably one day soon I’ll say ‘No, you know what, let’s go back.’”17

High costs mean a real possibility of becoming destitute in order to pay legal fees. These criteria also
incentivize taking under-the-table jobs which can render claimants vulnerable to abusive or unsafe working
conditions, and a lower likelihood of seeking redress or protection.
Finally, variation in support between provinces means some regions face a higher and more sustained
demand on services. For example, the absence of legal aid throughout Atlantic Canada and in Saskatchewan
means claimants are incentivized to remain where resources are already stretched. Some evidence suggests
variation results in venue-shopping for refugee claimants, undermining responsibility-sharing between

16. Statistics Canada. 2021. “LICOs before and after tax by community size and family size, in current dollars”.
https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=1110024101.
17. Online Interview (Toronto), 18 March, 2021.
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provinces. Over time this can erode the refugee determination process. To use a comparative example,
variation in asylum and reception conditions throughout Europe has been found to instigate politicization
and a “race-to-the-bottom” of national systems (Gottwald 2014; Thielemann 2018).
Evidence from interviews suggests claimants made decisions based on the availability of legal aid Several
moved between provinces based on rumours around availability and quality of legal aid, and in particular,
left Québec because of language barriers when accessing counsel. Stakeholders we spoke to in Atlantic
provinces related that they receive far fewer claimants given the lack of resources. A front-line support
worker from Alberta told us: “Sometimes we have an influx of claimants from other provinces coming
to Alberta because of the threat that they may not be able to receive [legal aid]. We see people who have
made claims in other provinces, but because they feel that they may not receive representation, they
make their way over here.”18

IMPACTS OF REPRESENTATION ON IRB EFFICIENCY
Our research findings showed that representation by counsel significantly affects IRB efficiency. 81%
of Member respondents strongly or somewhat agreed with the statement “I can do my job more
efficiently when claimants / appellants are represented by counsel.” Only 3.2% strongly disagreed with
the statement. The majority reported a lack of representation or poor representation resulted in longer
hearings, postponements in the hearing process, missed deadlines, or inappropriate or incomplete
evidence. 80% of RAD Members strongly or somewhat agreed that the lack of or poor representation
meant poorly-prepared appeals.

FIG. 4: IRB MEMBER OPINIONS
RESULTS OF ABSENCE OF / POOR REPRESENTATION

18. Focus Group, 7 May, 2021.
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However, relationships between representation and appeals
are less straightforward than hypothesized at the outset of
the project. As described in Table 2, with the exception of
FY2019-20 and FY2020-21, represented claimants have been
significantly more likely to appeal negative decisions – on
average more than one and half times as likely.19 However,
by the time the large increase of asylum claims from 2016
and 2017 began working their way through the asylum
system, appeal rates were relatively equal, though far larger
for represented claimants in absolute terms. Appeal rates
for represented claimants increased significantly from 21%
in FY2013-14 to a high of 29% in FY2018-19 and FY2019-20,
despite relatively consistent positive decision rates. Likewise,
the total number of appeals for both represented and selfrepresented claimants has increased significantly given higher
overall claim and RPD decision rates.

Over 80% of IRB Members agreed
that they could do their jobs more
effciently when claimants were
represented by counsel.
Likewise, over 80% agreed that
“The IRB process is more effcient
when claimants are represented
by counsel whose focus is
exclusively immigration and
refugee law.”
While only 22.8% of IRB Members
agreed that absence of counsel
was a signifcant issue in their
region, 89.1% agreed that lowquality counsel was.

TABLE 2:
NATIONAL APPEAL RATES OF FINALIZED RPD CLAIMS
FY2013-14 TO FY2020-21 NEW SYSTEM CLAIMS

19. More granular data on appeals, including data on countries of origin, positive decision rates, and appeal outcomes will be explored in future academic
research papers.
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Yet this data masks complex underlying dynamics around the
appeals process. Interviews with stakeholders, particularly
lawyers, suggest that self-represented claimants are more
likely to abandon the process altogether after a negative first
decision. Likewise, claims considered abandoned because of
missed deadlines for filing documentation are not eligible for
appeal. As survey results illustrate, Members find that
self-represented or poor represented claimants frequently
miss deadlines. Most consequentially, appellants must submit
written legal arguments, which are complex and require
specialized knowledge on case law, administrative law, and
IRB procedures. RAD Notices of Appeal must be
filed within fifteen days of an RPD decision, with full
submissions filed within forty-five days. They must directly
challenge the RPD decision rather than reframing or
bolstering an initial claim, though in some instances, appeals
can include new evidence.20

If the claimant is poorly
represented in the RPD process,
I often feel like my hands are
tied at the RAD. For example,
if the claimant had supportive
documents or evidence that
could have corroborated their
testimony and narrative at the
time of the RPD decision, but
didn’t submit them, it’s rare I can
admit such evidence on appeal.
This can sometimes severely
hamstring a claimant.
-Refugee Appeal Division Member

THE CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE OF QUALITY COUNSEL
One major finding, supported by all stakeholders in the refugee claim process, is that quality of representation
is a significant and long-standing issue in terms of impacts on efficiency, outcomes, and access to justice.
While only 22.8% of IRB Members agreed (4.4% strongly, 18.4% somewhat) that absence of counsel was a
significant issue in their region, 89.1% agreed (41.8% strongly, 37.3% somewhat) that low-quality counsel was.
As one RPD Member described:
If a claimant is entirely unrepresented, then I assume, from the beginning, that I may need to take
a significant amount of time at the hearing to understand their story. I assume that their [BOC]
may focus on irrelevant things, or fail to include very important things. I assume that they would
not submit corroborating evidence because they would not understand the importance of doing
so. I assume I will need to explain procedural aspects at the beginning of the hearing. I am able
to adjust my approach with the understanding that no one has prepared the claimant for what
is to come.
[Inadequate counsel] can take a number of forms. For example, counsel may focus strongly
on particular aspects […] but entirely neglect the “heart” of the issue, which will be legally
determinative. Counsel may waste (or try to waste) a significant amount of time on irrelevant
issues. Counsel maybe belligerent or argumentative about minor issues (thankfully, this is rare).
Counsel may […] encourage the claimant to lead me to believe the case rests on a particular
nexus (for example, their religion) while entirely neglecting other possible claims (for example,
gender or political opinion).
[…] In practice, the two issues play out differently. Although a hearing for an unrepresented
claimant will usually take longer, I don’t need to worry about being pointed in the wrong direction
from the very beginning.
20. See IRB “Appellant’s Guide”: https://irb.gc.ca/en/refugee-appeals/Pages/RefAppGuide.aspx.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3980954

“FIG. 5: IRB MEMBER OPINIONS:
IMPACTS OF COUNSEL ON EFFICIENCY”

30

Interviews and focus groups supported survey results. Several participants related that some low-quality
private lawyers who accept legal aid certificates have been a long-running issue across provinces. The
most common types of lawyers which focus groups, survey respondents, and claimant participants raised
concerns about were lawyers not working as staff at devoted refugee legal-aid offices, lawyers who did
not focus predominantly on immigration and refugee law, and refugee-focused lawyers who accepted
high volumes of claims, particularly those who focused their practice on specific national communities.
It should also be stressed, however, that the research methods asked specifically about low-quality
representation and impacts on access to justice. Research participants in focus groups stressed that the
majority of counsel are devoted to providing high-quality representation and accept lower remuneration
for their labour than in other fields of law. Participants also recognized that many high-quality counsel
work at firms practicing in multiple legal fields.
Claimant participants related narratives of counsel who underprepared for hearings, missed deadlines for
filing evidence, and in two cases took overly and unnecessarily adversarial stance with Members. Claimant
participants who hired private lawyers were surprised at their lack of familiarity with the IRB, including
submitting evidence that does not meet the IRB’s submission protocols.21 Over 80% of RPD Members who
responded agreed that “The IRB process is more efficient when claimants are represented by counsel
whose focus is exclusively immigration and refugee law.” Likewise, focus group participants reflecting on
survey findings noted that IRB Members would likely prefer to engage with self-represented claimants
than those represented by poor-quality counsel.
21. IRB guidelines on gathering and submitting evidence: https://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/applying-refugee-protection/Pages/index3.aspx.
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When asked about policy recommendations, some focus group participants suggested the problem could
be ameliorated by significant funding and regulatory changes to ensure all claimants were represented
by specialized refugee legal aid offices. Others cautioned that doing so would significantly decrease
overall capacity if private lawyers were unable to accept legal aid certificates, and that regulatory changes
to oversight might better ensure higher-quality representation. There is some precedent for these types
of initiatives. In 2015, LAO launched a program to improve standards of admission to its Immigration
and Refugee Panel by removing all existing lawyers and requiring a new standards-based application
process – resulting in a reduction of the panel from 680 lawyers in July 2015 to 291 in March 2016
(Teklu 2020: 14).22

CASE STUDY
A 38-year-old claimant was a practicing lawyer in Ecuador before arriving in Canada.
He was eligible for legal aid and matched with a junior lawyer who spoke no Spanish.
A translator became the lawyer’s de-facto representative, often taking meetings alone.
The claimant provided his own 30-page document, in Spanish, detailing his reasons
for fight. The BOC submitted to the RPD was less than ten pages.
“The lawyer said ‘Don’t worry because the hearing is the place to fesh these things out,
you’ll be able to speak and give the particulars.’ I thought things were going well. I was
satisfed because the story was clear and I had letters from my psychiatrist, evidence
about my injuries, letters from colleagues. At the hearing I began telling everything
[about experiences of abuse based on sexual orientation], up to the point I left the
country because of police attacks. There were a lot of details that I had told the
translator, but that the lawyer didn’t know about and weren’t included in the BOC.
The [IRB Member] began looking upset and questioning in a way that made me feel
attacked. ‘Stop. Why aren’t these details included? You’re giving us details that aren’t
part of your BOC.’ And I kept turning to my lawyer and she looked nervous too, fipping
through the evidence. That’s when I started feeling things were going negatively […]
I felt that the experience started changing. So, I focused on an incident where I was
attacked with [weapons]. The reason I left. I thought that would be the focus of the
Member’s questions. But instead, they focused on the details that were missing, asking
‘Why are you making this claim? Why is this the frst time I’m hearing about this?’

22. 435 of 680 empaneled lawyers applied to the new system. Of those, 168 were removed, including those formally removed for not meetings standards, and
those who resigned after not passing an initial evaluation, or failure to respond to further information, leaving 267 from the pre-2015 panel.
Evaluation of the Immigration and Refugee Panel Standards Implementation: Final Report. p49
23. See also: LAO, December 2016. Evaluation of the Immigration and Refugee Panel Standards Implementation: Executive Summary.
https://www-legacy.legalaid.on.ca/en/publications/execsummary-refugee-panel-standards-evaluation-2016-12.asp.
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The whole hearing became not about what was in the BOC, but what the lawyer had
left out.
When I read the [negative decision letter] I started laughing. I don’t know if it was nervous
laughter, compulsive laughter… my reaction was just that I couldn’t believe. The decision
didn’t focus on my PTSD or the attacks, but on things like I’m a young man, I could have
gotten a new job in Ecuador, I could have moved to another city. But I didn’t come here
for work. I had a job, a good job, I was a lawyer for seven years. I was kind of ‘elite’
I guess you would say. But because I was gay, I was beaten by police and had no
protection. But my lawyer didn’t focus on that.”
The claimant hired a Spanish-speaking private lawyer to fle an appeal, who told him
the RPD Member had high rejection rates for people from Latin America, which his
previous lawyer working through a legal aid certifcate had not been prepared for.

However, LAO reported that the process incurred significant administrative and financial burdens and
was not sustainable over time.23 Stakeholders from legal aid plans reported that some private bar
lawyers – or their staff including junior lawyers, paralegals, and Immigration Consultants – often seemed
disinterested in clients’ cases, and that low-quality counsel is an enduring problem. While they noted
provincial law societies exercised official oversight over low-quality counsel, overstretched capacity at
law societies and within legal aid plans, combined with the fact that the onus was often on claimants to
report poor representation meant redress was rare in practice.

THE HIDDEN PROBLEM OF ABUSIVE COUNSEL
While it must be emphasized that our findings should not be taken to impugn the motives or capacity of
the majority of counsel who represent refugee claimants, our research also revealed cases of problematic
lawyers systematically abusing clients. We present these findings in the interest of highlighting a persistent
and particularly pernicious barrier to justice with significant impacts on vulnerable individuals and public
perception of both refugees and Canada’s asylum system.
Low legal aid fees incentivize some lawyers to take on a high volume of cases, leading to poor representation
and neglect of individual claimants. In other cases, lawyers who accept legal aid certificates charge claimants
for services that should be covered by those fees, or suggest additional fees outside of the legal aid structure.
In the most problematic cases, lawyers have developed business models based on squeezing money from
claimants, often with the collusion of translators, other professionals. In the most extreme cases, this
includes working with collaborators in countries of origin.
The most common experience of abusive counsel involved private lawyers giving little to no attention to
legal aid files because they are not lucrative. As a claimant from Tanzania described:
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My lawyer didn’t have time for me, he kept telling me ‘Oh, you know you’re just being sponsored
by government’ and ‘you know, this money of yours from Legal Aid, it’s very little money, if I’m
working with people like you, I won’t even be able to pay for my bills.’ It was very disheartening.
The way he treated me felt…made me feel so worthless. Like he kept reminding me ‘Oh,
you’re sponsored by the government. The government is paying for you. Do you know how
much Legal Aid is paying us?’ I told him I don’t know. It’s my first time in such a country.”24
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We spoke with a 36-year-old single mother from the Democratic Republic of Congo. She originally stayed
at a shelter in Toronto, where she was matched with a novice lawyer accepting legal aid certificates. The
lawyer offered an initial meeting for preparing her BOC, which the participant described as “very short
and tense”. The participant followed up after a month, and the lawyer reacted by telling her to “stop
wasting his time” and to wait until she received a hearing date from the IRB. They did not return calls
or emails for over six months, during which time the claimant’s visa and passport expired. Shelter staff
intervened, and discovered the lawyer had never submitted her BOC, yet had filed a legal aid certificate.
The IRB considered her claim abandoned, leaving her without status in Canada. The Canadian Border
Services Agency gave notice that they would enforce a removal (deportation) order. When shelter staff
contacted the lawyer again, he asked: “You know most of these claimants from the Congo are liars anyway,
right?” The participant’s removal was stayed through a Pre-Removal Risk Assessment (PRRA), filed by probono lawyers who she was connected to by a refugee shelter, and she is now a Canadian citizen. PRRA
applications have a success rate of around 2-3%.25
Participants who work with claimants in Hamilton, London, Toronto, and Montréal noted experiences of
private lawyers working under a legal aid certificate charging extra fees for office tasks and submitting
documents, which should be covered by legal aid fees. In two cases, we heard of private lawyers not
working under legal aid in London and Montréal pressing clients to provide translation work for conationals to cover costs – one of whom was subsequently sanctioned. However, it must be noted
that participants in focus groups took pains to point to the intersection between abusive counsel and
inadequate legal aid funding. For example, LAO pays an average of $2,500 CAD per claim, with hourly
tariffs and add-ons for more complex cases. Tariffs in Québec are significantly lower at roughly $1,000
CAD per claim, with add-ons only in the case of additional family members on applications. As described
in “Table 1” above, the average cost per legal aid certificate varies significantly across provinces. Preparing
claims can often take up significantly more resources, which often go unremunerated, incentivizing
abusive practices.
Our findings suggest abusive lawyers advance their own agendas by taking advantage of claimants’ lack
of knowledge, the limited availability of other lawyers who are willing to accept legal aid certificates, and
emergency situations such as the 2019 funding cuts in Ontario. A Director from LAO noted how these
dynamics intersect:
People like us, working in the field, we read a new press release, or pick up the phone and
ask a colleague. We can wade through the news easily. But someone who’s going through the
asylum process is a different story. Especially to the extent that claimants are likely to be
victims of exploitation, there’s people who are happy to have the message be that there’s
no legal aid, right? So now they can start charging money to assist this client.

24. Online interview (Toronto), 25 March, 2021.
25. In 2016 the Government of Canada published an assessment of the PRRA program.
See: https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/corporate/reports-statistics/evaluations/removal-risk-assessment-program/prra.html.
It must be noted, however, that these statistics represent claimants who have progressed through the stages of the asylum process, and so are
not representative of first-instance decisions now undertaken as a result of changes to IRPA in 2019.
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Stakeholders, claimants, and IRB Members also noted instances of abuse are often concentrated in
specific national or linguistic communities, which are also nationalities with the highest volume of
claims in recent years. Our survey asked Members to what extent they agreed with the statement that
“Claimants from particular countries of origin appear to experience greater challenges accessing highquality counsel.” 62% strongly or somewhat agreed (though 17.1% declined to answer). Over 70% of
those who answered agreed with the statement. If they agreed, Members were asked to list up to three
countries for which this was the case – the top five countries listed were Nigeria (47), Haiti (22), India
(18), Mexico (18), and Pakistan (10). Likewise, 25.3% and 37.3% respectively agreed it was “very” and
“somewhat common” to “encounter a BOC narrative that is strikingly similar to those of other claimants /
appellants from the same country of origin”. Only 7% considered it “very rare”.
However, this finding requires significant qualification from a public interest perspective. Strikingly similar
claims should not be read as evidence that claimants do not have a well-founded fear of persecution,
but rather that they are often represented by counsel who process a high volume of claims from specific
communities, and who therefore, often submit BOCs which potentially recycle portions of narratives.
While strikingly similar narratives undermine claimants’ credibility, they do not equate to a lack of need
for protection, and the RPD hearing process means Members should be able to understand and make
decisions on the merits of a specific case.
Lawyers sometimes submit what IRB Members referred to as“boilerplate submissions”, and “bombard”
the IRB with documentation which serve to undermine, rather than bolster, credibility assessments. One
RPD Member noted the effects on IRB efficiency and access to justice:
You get the sense they are running a factory. [For example]: a Punjabi farmer wants to stay.
Somehow, they end up making a refugee claim, the claims have the same fact pattern, you
look at these poor people who are making hopeless claims. Counsel throws everything into
the mix:politics, farmer strikes, COVID - all of this has to be addressed in the reasons. It takes
forever to deal with it all. The claimants are, undoubtedly, paying a lot of money for a claim
that should not have been filed in the first place.

CASE STUDY
A participant from Uganda was not eligible for legal aid, and could not fnd a lawyer
to help prepare their claim. They faced looming deadlines, and approached members
of their community for advice.
“I talked to people from my community and they’re like ‘There’s this new Ugandan lawyer,
he’s just graduated. I think he can be good because he doesn’t have so many clients.’
Even the little money I had saved for my children, I paid it all to him and my kids are
back in Uganda suffering. He ate my money and he didn’t do anything.
When I go and meet him, he made me sign a contract [and said] ‘I’m not on Legal Aid
so you have to pay me by cash.’ I trusted him because he was from my country, and I was
so desperate so I said yes. He said ‘My retainer and everything will cost you $4500
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and I need my money today, now.’ I told him ‘I don’t have the money right now but I can
make a deposit.’ I started paying him that day, I think I paid him $1500 […] He told
me to collect [evidence] and ‘Go to a psychologist to make you a report about abuse’
and I told him ‘I have a psychiatrist I’m seeing.’ He said ‘I don’t like that psychiatrist,
I’ve told you go to this one, he makes the right reports for IRB.’ He charged me $500
cash. So already that was $5000. Later I also got affdavits in handwriting [because]
my husband and my cousins were writing for me from Uganda and he says ‘I don’t like
these affdavits so I’m going to call someone to write them for you. You have to pay
then your husband will sign.’ And I was running out of time, I had to submit things […]
So, I had to look for $600 to pay to get the affdavit. And then he’s like ‘You need to
send things to Uganda to have them notarized.’ So, he connects me to a contact in
Uganda and it’s around $500 or $600 more but he takes the money. So more than
$6000, just like that. And more every week for photocopies and meetings. It was all
about money and I’m trying to get justice. All I wanted was to at least get justice.”
The participant did not anticipate the signifcant extra expenses, and felt like they
were stuck in a position where they were forced to exhaust their savings under tight
timelines. Problems with the lawyer persisted, including demands to borrow money
from other community members, and disclosing the claimant’s HIV status to members
of her community without her consent. The IRB eventually suspended her hearing given
the lawyer’s poor submissions, hostility toward the claimant, and hostility toward the
RPD Member. They were granted a de novo hearing, and their fnancial situation means
they are now eligible for legal aid for her new fling.
Lack of access to services and reliable information mean some communities are particularly vulnerable to
predatory practices. A lawyer directing a legal clinic in Toronto described “very uncomfortable”
relationships between private lawyers and interpreters who work with the same communities, noting:
[There are] individuals within a certain community that act as shepherds initially for refugee
claimants. And they, through community contacts, get connected with recent arrivals [...] and
have initial counselling sessions or try and shape what it is that a particular refugee claimant
is going to say and suggests what would increase their chances of being successful. These
figures usually have very unethical business relationships with lawyers that are funded by
LAO [..] they sit and interview a claimant to draw out their narrative and crystalize that into
a BOC. I can think of two or three [current] cases where claims were unsuccessful because
the interpreter chose not to interpret key aspects of the narrative or massage it in such a
way that it raised credibility issues. And the lawyer was just complicit in all of this. The lawyer
sat back and uncritically wrote down everything that was being said […] There’s an issue of
competence.26
26. Online Focus Group, 7 May 2021.
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While instances of abusive or grossly incompetent counsel are
relatively rare, they are important to emphasize given that
they can have outsized influence on policy, undermine public
trust, and contribute to damaging narratives of “bogus”
claims for entire groups. For example, Rehaag’s (2015) study
on abusive counsel representing Hungarian Roma claimants
from 2008 to 2012 found positive decisions were higher when
lawyers worked on fewer claims. Claimants represented by
counsel who worked on ten or fewer of these cases succeeded
at a rate of 2.9 times higher than those who had been
involved in 20 or more. A small group of three lawyers were
responsible for 34.2% of cases involved just three lawyers.
Eight lawyers were responsible for 52.5% of all cases. Years
later, several of these lawyers ended up being disciplined
for providing incompetent counsel. But the damage both to
hundreds of individual refugee claimants and to the refugee
determination system as a whole was done: sensationalized
accounts of “bogus” Roma claimants, based on these small
number of cases and problematic lawyers, were mobilized
to pass legislation which undermined the rights of all asylum
seekers from designated countries (see Molnar 2014).

Obviously, the Law Society is the
one that regulates lawyers so we
could just say ‘Clients should just
make complaints to the Law
Society.’ We found over the last
30 years that doesn’t work.
Clients don’t make complaints
to the Law Society. Clients don’t
make complaints to Legal Aid.
The complaints we tend to get
come from new counsel who’ve
taken on a fle and they’re
basically saying ‘We need to make
this complaint in order to have
your appeal be successful.’ The
complaints we get […] tend to be
super serious but they’re few and
far between. Sometimes an NGO
might assist a client […] but even
then, we’re talking maybe six per
year. It’s so small. And these
situations happen all the time.

While the process of filing complaints for poor-quality
representation arises across Canada’s legal systems, it is
particularly troubling for immigration and refugee law.
Refugee claimants are in structurally vulnerable positions, and
often facing overlapping stressors, including the prospect of
deportation. As a member of the Canadian Association of
Refugee Lawyers explained: “The idea that someone going
through the asylum process […] is going to launch an appeal
to a law society or bar association is frankly a fantasy […]
-LAO Representative
there’s functionally no recourse and I think [abusive lawyers]
know this and take advantage of it.”27 To return to the case
of Roma claimants: three of the six highest volume lawyers were subject to disciplinary proceedings.
But even these cases, with an abundance of evidence, took years to wind their way through disciplinary
proceedings, and only one who refused to cooperate was disbarred. The majority of affected claimants
were deported in the meantime.

In the worst cases, according to statements we received from front-line personnel, some lawyers appear
to be complicit in international schemes to recruit and extort claimants. According to research
participants, these claimants are promised permanent residency for significant fees and then forced
into the asylum stream on arrival. These reports appear to be consistent with previous media attention
regarding allegations about fraudulent and abusive practices (see Stevenson 2021). However, claimants
who were approached for more information declined to participate in the study.

27. Online Focus Group, 17 May 2021.
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This project’s central conclusion is that early and consistent access to reliable, publicly-funded legal
representation can significantly improve access to justice for refugee claimants in Canada. In turn, access
to justice for claimants will contribute to better overall outcomes, including fairness, efficiency, and
upholding principles of natural justice underpinning administrative law. Investments in both the quantity
and quality of available legal aid could have outsized positive returns, including fewer instances of
unnecessary appeals, RPD reconsiderations, and judicial review. Fewer negative decisions resulting from
self-representation or low-quality representation would also mean a significant decrease in the number
of applications to stay on humanitarian and compassionate grounds or pre-removal risk assessments,
not to mention the incredibly high (and socially damaging) cost of enforcing removal orders. In effect,
investments at the early stages could be considered an insurance policy for the refuge system as a whole.
Recurring funding crises exacerbate inefficacies and barriers to justice in complex ways. Quantitative
data on funding and representation rates across the country illustrates that more capacity for legal aid
plans correlates with higher rates of representation before the RPD. Indeed, while the overall percentage
of self-represented claimants remains relatively constant from year to year, the total number of selfrepresented claimants increases dramatically in absolute terms when there are large increases in claims
without proportionately increased investments in legal aid.
Qualitative data from the project suggests that lack of early access to high-quality counsel increases the
likelihood of self-represented or poorly-represented claimants, and exposure to abusive counsel. From
a purely economic perspective, we make the qualified inference that ensuring access to justice would
contribute to social returns on investment by improving efficiency at the IRB and reducing demand
on social services, particularly the reliance on NGOs and CSOs to engage in “damage control” or catch
claimants who “fall through the cracks” of the system as a result of poor-quality or self-representation.
While our data collection and methods do not allow for financial analysis on relationships between the
costs of increased funding for legal aid and IRB efficiency returns, we hope this study will contribute to
the growing body of comparative international and Canadian research on access to justice investments
and positive returns on overall state expenditures, better economic performance among immigrant
populations, and lower costs to address adverse effects of barriers to justice (see Citizens Advice Bureau
2010; Smith, Thayer, & Garwold 2013; Moore & Farrow 2019). We can claim with some confidence that
the Federal Government’s investments in IRB capacity are undermined by a lack of commensurate
investment in legal aid for claimants given the growing overall number of self-represented claimants and
appeal rates. Indeed, high-quality representation and IRB capacity are two sides of the same coin for
maintaining the integrity of Canada’s asylum system.
It must be noted that while the vast majority of refugee lawyers provide high-quality representation and
are generally not overly profit-driven, the lack of accountability for low-quality or abusive counsel creates
serious problems and might also undermine new investments in legal aid. The actions of a few unethical
counsel erode public trust in the asylum system. Claimants, who are often victims of exploitation, are
scapegoated as “bogus” or “queue jumpers” if they come from national groups with low recognition rates.
This politicization misses the fundamental point that the IRB’s purpose is to decide the merit of cases.
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While stable and appropriate levels of funding for legal aid are essential, financial investments alone
will not eliminate the problem of low-quality or abusive counsel. In addition to such investments, there is
also an urgent need for measures directed at encouraging high quality counsel and directing claimants to
high quality counsel, while also detecting and sanctioning incompetent and abusive counsel.

ENSURE STABLE AND FLEXIBLE LEGAL AID FUNDING
•

The Federal Government should provide a stable, forward-looking funding stream to cover
the full cost of refugee law services for provincial Legal Aid Plans. Additional funding should
be earmarked to be responsive to significant increases in demand for services, and should be
adjustable to reflect significant increases in refugee claims mid-fiscal year. Ongoing funding
should also be subject to Legal Aid Plans demonstrating the effectiveness of quality of counsel
oversight for funded refugee law services, with extra financial and administrative resources to
cover this time and cost-intensive exercise.

•

Legal Aid Plans should reconsider funding eligibility benchmarks for refugee claimants which are
specifically tied to Federal Low-Income Cut-Off levels, in addition to considerations for claimants who
begin working during the process and drop out of eligibility, yet are still financially vulnerable and
unable to cover the cost of private lawyers. The Federal Government should consider partnering
with provinces to provide commensurate funding increases. Doing so would likely significantly
increase returns on investment at the IRB.

•

The Treasury Board of Canada Secretariate, Department of Finance & Department of Justice
should consider a quantitative audit exploring relationships between legal aid expenditures, IRB
efficiency, and the financial and social costs of poor-quality and self-representation. The audit should
consider investment in legal aid and increased likelihood of positive decisions at the IRB against the
costs of appeal procedures to the point of removal orders, and costs of enforcing removal orders.
Moreover, more complete and disaggregated data on whether claimants are supported by
legal aid at different stages of their claim would enable research on relationships between
representation and access to justice throughout the asylum process.
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MAINSTREAM EARLY ACCESS TO QUALITY COUNSEL AND
HEARING PREPARATION
•

Legal Aid Plans should reconsider protocols for connecting eligible claimants with counsel.
Notwithstanding the reported high quality of most counsel, in some provinces, presenting lists of
lawyers without some form of vetting puts claimants in a disadvantaged position given the absence
of information about the quality or specialization of counsel. Lawyers presented as options to
claimants should be regularly assessed for the quality of services that they provide in order to
continue being listed. Programs to directly assist claimants in securing counsel from lawyers on the
vetted list should be considered, including mechanisms to provide additional information about
the types of cases individual lawyers are inclined to accept.
In collaboration with Law Societies, Legal Aid Plans should make claimants aware of their rights
in general in regards to what they are entitled to when being served by legal aid, and when
encountering problematic counsel. They should publish clear indications of whether lawyers have
been the subject of past complaints.

•

Provincial and Federal Governments should provide long-term funding for hearing preparation
and mock hearing programs in all major cities with large claimant populations, including for
claimants pushed to PRRA-only streams after the 2019 changes to IRPA. These should be
developed in collaboration with existing successful models. NGOs, shelters, and legal clinics are
well-placed to provide and facilitate such training. A devoted funding stream through IRCC’s
Service Delivery Innovation grants should be considered.
Hearing preparation programs should include expectations with regards to lawyers and other
counsel, and a clear set of actions for recourse if responsibilities and ethical duties are not met.

•

Private Law Firms – and especially mid- to large-sized firms – should consider bolstering the
ranks of refugee lawyers by signing on to the Global Refugee Forum’s Legal Community Pledge
to provide more pro-bono support for claimants who are ineligible for legal aid, particularly in
provinces that do not fund refugee legal aid and at later stages of the process where many claimants
are ineligible for legal aid. They should develop a streamlined referral process in collaboration with
Legal Aid Plans.28

28. UNHCR. 8 June, 2021. “Global Legal Community Steps up for Refugees amid Pandemic, providing 165,000 hours of free legal aid.”
https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2021/6/60bf8ad34/global-legal-community-steps-refugees-amid-pandemic-providing-165000-hours.html.
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INCREASE OVERSIGHT & REPORTING STRUCTURES
FOR LOW-QUALITY OR ABUSIVE COUNSEL
•

Law Societies, Legal Aid Plans, and Provincial Governments should explore possible structural
changes to the refugee legal aid model, particularly the potential for developing models of “onestop”, devoted refugee legal aid offices which would handle a larger proportion of asylum claims.
A first step would be exploring comparative international examples and the functioning and
efficiency of legal aid clinics in Canada as a model for scaling. These offices could be readily paired
with NGOs and community groups to provide wraparound support for claimants.

•

Law Societies, Legal Aid Plans, and the IRB should enter discussions to establish a clear and
standardized reporting structure for problem counsel. Each stakeholder should have the capacity
to report individuals. Stakeholders should also enter discussions about opportunities for further
data sharing, including ways of doing so that respect privacy concerns. The IRB, in particular,
should have a clear process for raising concerns about counsel not only with the Law Societies but
also with Legal Aid Plans.29

40

Refugee claimants should be considered as key stakeholders, and provided with a clear,
well-publicized, and low-barrier system with facilities for language interpretation for reporting
problem counsel.
While investigative procedures and sanctions for professional misconduct are well-established,
they are time-consuming and prohibitive for refugee claimants. A reporting system with clear
thresholds around types and frequency of complaints could immediately exclude lawyers from
filing legal aid certificates or eligibility to represent claims at the IRB while under investigation.

•

Law Societies and Legal Aid Plans should, as an addition to an effective complaints-based system
for problem counsel, explore opportunities for non-complaints-based oversight, such as random quality
of counsel audits (perhaps triggered by volume) for lawyers working with vulnerable populations as
a condition for continued empanelment. Quality control might also include a hard cap for the
number of cases taken up in a given year or limiting the number of open cases, rather than current
caps based on billing hours.30

•

Legal Aid Plans should offer more flexible and streamlined options for changing counsel in
the event of justified complaints.31 The IRB should automatically extend deadlines for filings and
appearances at the IRB in the event of complaints or a problematic quality of counsel audit,
unless there is serious reason to believe that the process is being used abusively.

29. See IRB’s Policy on Disclosing Information Regarding the Conduct of Authorized Representatives to
Regulatory Bodies: https://irb.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/policies/pages/PolCondRep.aspx
30. For example, see LAOs “Legal Aid Service Rules” 60(3): “A roster member shall not be paid in a fiscal year more than the dollar value equivalent of 2,350 hours of
services provided by the roster member multiplied by the member’s tier rate…”.
https://www.legalaid.on.ca/wp-content/uploads/Legal-Aid-Services-Act-2020_Rules-EN.pdf.
31. As noted above, in Québec there are no regulatory barriers to the number of times a claimant can change lawyers working under a legal aid mandate.
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